In managing international rivers, governments are subject to two different boundaries. The socio-politically constructed boundaries governed by sovereignty and the physical boundaries imposed by the river's hydrology. The existence of a hydrological interdependency within an international basin means that ''how'' it is managed is important in constructing certainty in water supply. We compare two experiences from Europe and Africa to see the effect of sovereignty on the management of a basin's hydro-interdependency. Portugal and Spain have followed a Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty in the Guadiana basin to develop their physical infrastructure unilaterally and ''sever'' the hydro-interdependency. In contrast, using an operational interpretation of sovereignty, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal have chosen to embrace the Senegal river's hydro-interdependency and develop it jointly. A key lesson that emerges is that the approach used determines the pattern of resilience constructed in each system.
Introduction
Water's key characteristic distinguishing its management from other natural resources is that it flows. This attribute configures the hydrological interdependency and physical integrity of river basins and creates a complex hydrological feedback loop between the users situated in a basin. Managing the hydrointerdependency is part of the myriad challenges governments must face in ensuring a reliable water supply commensurate with national demand (Saurí & del Moral, 2001; Sadoff & Grey, 2002) . These challenges are exacerbated by the imposition of international borders in river basins which generate a sharp disconnect between the politically constructed notion of sovereignty and the physical hydrology of rivers (Giordano & Wolf, 2003; Conway, 2005) .
With governments interpreting sovereignty as denoting control over their territory and the autonomy to act, countries sharing an international river must each contend with their co-riparians intervening to safeguard the full extent of their sovereign rights. Consequently, a nation state acting to secure its water supply from an international river will have an impact on and be subject to the consequences of its co-riparian's exercise of sovereignty over the resources in its territory. Thus, the hydrointerdependency of international rivers presents considerable uncertainty for governments seeking to guarantee known volumes (and quality) of water to meet national demand. While considerable effort is devoted to delineating water rights internationally through treaties and legal conventions, the illusion of sovereign control is punctured by the rivers themselves which challenge the socially constructed borders insisting on the territorial integrity of its basin on a daily, weekly, seasonal and annual basis.
The vulnerability of co-riparians to decisions made elsewhere in an international basin is illustrated by the case of Mozambique. The country is the ''downstream-most'' riparian on nine international rivers. One river, the Zambezi, spans the entire width of southern Africa. Thus, Angola's decisions, on southern Africa's western coast, regarding the use of the Zambezi river in its sovereign territory will have an impact on Mozambican society, economy and environment on the eastern coast.
Mozambique's vulnerability as the downstream-most riparian is borne out by the flooding of the Limpopo, another shared river, in 2000 affecting some 4.5 million Mozambicans (Christie & Hanlon, 2001; Mondlane, 2005; Brouwer & Nhassengo, 2006) . Already the world's second most vulnerable population in terms of deaths per capita caused by natural disasters (Mondlane, 2005) , Mozambique suffered large-scale population deplacement and severe economic disruption. Gross domestic product (GDP) plummeted from an average annual growth rate of 7.5% since 1993 to 1.5% in 2000, with economic losses caused by the flood equating to 12% of the country's GDP (World Bank, 2005b) .
Although illustrated by an example of flooding, the impact of uncontrolled water availability is also felt through droughts as seen by the large socioeconomic and environmental consequences of the Sahelian droughts in the 1960s and 1970s (Derrick, 1977 ). An uncertain water supply is problematic for two reasons. First, because of the role water plays in socio-ecological systems means uncertain availability can have large social, political, ecological and financial consequences. Second, the need for water is increasing just as governments' ability to meet demand is decreasing. The resulting gap exacerbates the negative consequences that may already be in play. Most governments seek to minimise the uncertainty by exerting control over hydrological flows. On international rivers, this usually results in a two-pronged approach. At the national level, governments seek to exert control through physical infrastructure such as dams and canals (Dovers & Handmer, 1992; Frederick, 1997; Arnell, 1999; World Bank, 2005b ) and, on the international level, governments seek to create institutional infrastructure such as basin organisations or international treaties (HDR, 2006) .
In order to explore how co-riparian countries manage their hydro-interdependency and exercise sovereignty, we compare the experiences in two international basins. We begin by examining uncertainty and how to manage it in the presence of sovereignty. We draw on the literature of uncertainty, observe the role of infrastructure in shaping a resilient water supply, note Alam et al.'s (2009) observation of an interaction between infrastructure and sovereignty and identify the pattern of resilience that may be created.
We then examine how the hydro-interdependency is managed in two international river basins -the Guadiana basin, where Portugal and Spain have each chosen to develop the river unilaterally and the Senegal basin, where Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal have chosen to tackle drought and other uncertainties jointly. We use the Sadoff-Grey typology to categorise each basins' benefits, indicate the types of resilience constructed and identify any trade-offs (Sadoff & Grey, 2002) . We end by drawing our conclusions from the two approaches to manage uncertainty and construct resilient socio-ecological systems in international basins.
Sovereignty and certainty
The literature on managing uncertainty depicts a complex situation at the national level let alone at the international level, characterised by diverse actors, stressors and timescales (Dovers & Handmer, 1992; Arnell, 1999; Klein et al., 2003; Adger, 2006; Ziervogel et al., 2006; Risbey et al., 2007) . The myriad relationships governing events are both products of and reinforce this complex environment which suggests that what makes a system vulnerable can change. Therefore, any response seeking to construct a resilient water supply must include social, economic, political and technical factors, in order to minimise disastrous effects, restore socioeconomic vitality and build in the ability to adapt to future changes. However, as Klein et al. highlight, ''[r] esponses to environmental change are shaped by what is perceived to be politically and economically palatable in the near term rather than by the nature and scale of the threat itself' ' (2003, p. 39) . This can result in risk mitigation strategies maintaining the status quo rather than challenging the assumptions that perpetuate the risk.
Reliance on any one option suggests a trade-off between different types of resilience. Some trade-offs might advantage short-term gains that leave the system unable to change if the nature of vulnerability alters. Mercer et al. (2007) describe a tendency to rely on overly simplified and therefore inadequate, instruments to deal with complex interdependencies. For example, as water scarcity increases so does the interdependency between users, but this is often ignored in management decisions because policy makers tend to discount the future, the cost of supplying water and to underestimate the risk of over-allocation. A system's resilience can also be hampered by its own success. The ability to reduce exposure to a risk can be (mis)interpreted as eliminating the risk entirely and a licence to continue with business as usual. As Conway (2005) illustrates, the Aswan High Dam's construction strengthened Egypt's ability to manage the Nile river's annual variation and sustain irrigation. However, the dam does not protect against inter-decadal variation, nor can it guarantee supplies to new irrigation schemes, such as Toshka, if availability changes. Thus, although the dam has reduced Egypt's vulnerability, with the new schemes drawing on the same supply, the country's ability to absorb variation is diminished.
Burdened by the hydro-interdependency of a shared river, governments seek to isolate ''their'' water and thus tend to prioritise physical infrastructure because it is seen to provide adaptive capacity in managing fluctuations by storing and transporting water according to demand (Brown & Lall, 2006; Grey & Sadoff, 2007) . We recognise that a government's ability to build physical infrastructure will be influenced by its location (upstream or downstream) and whether it has sufficient political, financial or military might vis-à-vis its co-riparians. In other words, if the country is powerful or if it is the hydro-hegemon (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) it will have greater autonomy to act. The strategy of relying on physical infrastructure to meet growing demand has proven successful in the past, as evidenced by irrigated agriculture's ability to sustain economies and livelihoods (HDR, 2006) . However, as storage facilities have grown, expanding the water supply relies on using ever more marginal resources. As availability diminishes, the hydro-interdependency within a river basin is more keenly felt. This raises the question of whether a technical solution, such as physical infrastructure, can answer the complex social, ecological, financial and political problem of ensuring a reliable water supply? What becomes apparent is that storage facilities can increase a country's resilience, up to a point. This is because it also constrains the country's adaptive capacity by closing down other options, especially when the nature of change is uncertain as is the case with climatic change (Frederick, 1997) . There is also an opportunity cost as finite resources -water and financial -are committed to a particular strategy for ensuring a reliable water supply. Large water management schemes absorb substantial investment over time resulting in an inertia that counters any significant change such as relocation or cessation of an unsustainable economic activity (Klein et al., 2003) .
While we acknowledge the influence these issues have on a government's handling of the hydrointerdependency, we draw on Alam et al. (2009) to focus on the interaction between sovereignty and infrastructure in international rivers. Central to the relationship is recognition that sovereignty has different interpretations. Drawing on the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the traditional interpretation of sovereignty asserts a government's right and ability to control the resources within its territory without outside interference. However, in an era of economic and environmental interdependency, the notion of ''ability to control'' is challenged, for example, by transboundary pollution. International law, as demonstrated by the International Court of Justice's ruling on Lac Lanoux between France and Spain (McCaffrey, 2001) , also regards sovereignty as ''limited'' in that neither country was afforded the ability to exercise complete basin integrity nor sovereign territory. We agree with Delli Priscoli & Wolf's (2009) position that this interpretation of limited Westphalian sovereignty is integral to the 1997 Draft Convention on the Law of International Watercourses with its obligation for countries to notify co-riparians, provide for equitable use of shared waters and not cause appreciable harm.
Authors such as Karen Litfin and Robert Keohane (in Alam et al., 2009 ) challenge the very monolithic nature of Westphalian sovereignty, arguing that sovereignty comprises three components (autonomy, control and legitimacy). They view governments as using these components as bargaining tools to secure better terms during international negotiations. As shown in Figure 1 , Alam et al. (2009) compare the Westphalian or juridical interpretation of sovereignty with the operational or bargaining approach and juxtapose them with governments' handling of physical and institutional infrastructure.
According to Figure 1 , a government following a Westphalian or juridical interpretation will act to maximise their autonomy over their portion of the shared waters and, therefore, shun international institutional arrangements and choose to unilaterally build physical infrastructure on their sovereign territory. A government following a purely operational or bargaining interpretation would be willing to compromise its autonomy in order to gain greater control over the whole basin. Therefore, it would cooperate internationally to build both institutional and physical infrastructure. However, what emerges in most international rivers is a mixed approach to sovereignty, whereby, governments use both interpretations. Thus, governments simultaneously envisage joint development of an international river through treaties and basin organisations while unilaterally constructing the physical infrastructure needed to develop ''their'' water. The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) and its member states illustrate this dichotomous behaviour. As Gould & Zobrist (1989) Sadoff & Grey (2002) in framing the benefits derived from developing water resources and understanding the trade-offs.
Type I benefits are ''benefits to the river'' meaning the ecological benefits from a healthy ecosystem. Type II are ''benefits from the river'' meaning the economic benefits derived from using water to produce services. Type III are ''benefits because of the river'' meaning the reduction in social and political tensions intra-basin over unequal access to water. And Type IV are ''benefits that extend beyond the river'' meaning a strengthening of relationships that lead to non-water related agreements and ultimately, extrabasin integration.
The typology supports Klein et al.'s (2003) point that it is the interaction between issues that determines the resilience of a socio-ecological system rather than the strength of the individual components. This suggests that it is not simply a matter of ''what'' is done to construct resilience and manage uncertainty, but also a question of ''how'' it is done. On this premise, it is questionable whether governments will be able to build their way out of the compound uncertainties of an international river (Brouwer & Nhassengo, 2006; Risbey et al., 2007) . It would suggest, we argue, a need for both physical and institutional infrastructure to manage the hydro-interdependency more sustainably.
Managing hydro-interdependency in international basins
In this section, we examine how the riparians of two international basins managed their hydrological interdependency in order to supply their domestic demand. We used the Senegal basin as our starting point, having researched and worked with the riparian countries over several years and sought an international basin with which to compare its unprecedented cooperation (Alam et al., 2009) . We looked for the following criteria: similar climates since that would affect how water was used, a history of cooperation over water, a wider context of friendly relations similar to the pan-African movement, the presence of a one-party state in domestic politics comparable to the African ''big man'' syndrome and sufficient poverty to necessitate external funding for building physical infrastructure. The Guadiana basin, shared by Spain and Portugal, proved to be a useful equivalent. The Iberian Peninsula's semi-arid and arid climate is similar to that of the Senegal basin, which necessitates irrigated agriculture. Spain and Portugal have had a history of cooperation over water since 1879, embodied in successive treaties. The post-war development of water resources in the Iberian Peninsula occurred under the growing European project and its Common Agricultural Policy and, more recently, the Water Framework Directive. Both countries had political dictatorships, with General Francisco Franco ruling Spain from 1936 until his death in 1975 and António de Oliveira Salazar ruling Portugal between 1932 and 1968. Lastly, Franco's staunch anti-communist stance, afforded Spain the ability to construct its infrastructure with aid from the USA during the Cold War. Despite having devised the Alqueva scheme several decades before, Portugal could only afford to start its grand project once it secured funding from the EU.
In comparing the basins, it became apparent that the countries' approach to managing their hydrointerdependency differed according to the interpretation given to sovereignty and the decision to manage the hydro-interdependency unilaterally or jointly. As we will see, the Guadiana riparians placed greater emphasis on a Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty to create two separate hydrologic units by using physical infrastructure to ''sever'' the interdependency. In comparison, the Senegal riparians used an operational interpretation of sovereignty and chose to embrace the basin's hydro-interdependency through joint institutional and physical infrastructure.
''Severing'' interdependency in the Guadiana basin
Portugal and Spain share five rivers, including the Guadiana, totalling 45% (63 km 3 ) of the Iberian Peninsula's surface water (Maia, 2003; Vlachos, 2003; Cots et al., 2009) . Portugal relies on the international rivers for approximately 40% (25 km 3 ) of its water (Maia, 2003; Albergaria & Fidelis, 2006) . Given their hydrological interdependency, the countries first negotiated an agreement on their international rivers in 1879. Further iterations in 1912 Further iterations in , 1927 Further iterations in , 1964 Further iterations in , 1968 Further iterations in and 1998 , maintained a focus on the allocation of water (Barreira, 2003; Santafé-Martinez, 2003) . It is unclear why Spain and Portugal chose to sign these treaties as the academic literature is largely silent on this issue, although Santafé-Martinez (2003) does recount the bare history of this cooperation. We surmise that the treaties were not so much a form of cooperation, but a ''carving up'' of the resources between sovereign states. Santafé-Martinez (2003: 381) underpins this view in recounting that, ''[t] he model designed by the 1964 and 1968 Agreements suddenly entered a crisis in 1993. The immediate cause was determined by the Spanish Ministry of Public Works and Transport presenting the Preliminary Project of the Law on the National Hydrological Plan (APHN-93) during this year, which not only ignored Portugal's situation and its requirements, but also set forth transfer aqueducts from the transboundary rivers, particularly from the Douro to other areas in Spain, a point that formed a substantial modification of the status quo''.
In the latest iteration of cooperation, the 1998 Albuferia Agreement, Portugal sought to ensure that Spain maintained its international obligations despite its plans to extract more water upstream (Santafé-Martinez, 2003; Vlachos, 2003; Thiel, 2004) . Underscoring the countries' hydro-interdependency, Portugal also needed Spain's guarantee of minimum flows to secure European Community (EC) funds for the Alqueva multi-purpose project on the Guadiana river (see Figure 2) . Although Portugal had suggested the rivers' joint development, the agreement reaffirmed a unilateral approach, as long as minimum flows were maintained at key points along the river.
The Guadiana has been heavily regulated to provide hydrological stability against extreme interseasonal and spatial differences in rainfall, particularly, in Spain (Bromley et al., 2001; Marta et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003; Vlachos, 2003; Filipe et al., 2004; Cravo et al., 2006; Cots et al., 2009 ). There are up to 98 dams 1 basinwide, with the majority in Spain (Collares-Pereira et al., 2000; Godinho et al., 2000; Swyngedouw, 2007) . With demand for water increasing, both countries are planning another 25 dams each on the river (Collares-Pereira et al., 2000) . Though hydropower is important in the peninsula, the river's development has been primarily for agriculture (Trigo et al., 2004) .
Within the basin, it is the upper watershed in Spain that has been most heavily developed. As one of Europe's driest regions, dryland farming dominated this area until the early 1970s (Bromley et al., 2001; Cots et al., 2009) . Groundwater abstraction for irrigation was limited to 50 million m 3 per year from the Western La Mancha aquifer. However, pumped boreholes led to a rapid expansion in irrigated area. By 1995, the aquifer serviced more than 75% of irrigated land in the Upper Guadiana. Annual borehole discharge jumped from 0.2 km 3 to a peak of 0.69 km 3 (Bromley et al., 2001) .
In Portugal, the basin's development has centred on the Alqueva multi-use project, which is designed to prevent emigration from the sparsely populated Alentejo region (Marta et al., 2001) . The project aims to irrigate 110,000 ha, generate electricity and jobs and transfer water to the Sado basin (Collares-Pereira et al., 2000; Lobo et al., undated) . Originally proposed in 1957, the Alqueva project was boosted by the 1968 agreement that gave Portugal priority use of the Guadiana river (Albergaria & Fidelis, 2006) . However, it was only after Portugal joined the EC that funding became available from Brussels and the project was started in the late 1990s. The Alqueva reservoir was completed in 2002. Covering 200 km 2 , it is Europe's largest artificial lake, having cost approximately h1,250 million (US$1,700 million) (Filipe et al., 2004; Erzini, 2005; Lobo et al., undated) . The Alqueva dam's storage capacity (4.1 km 3 ) represents a 43% increase in the river's storage (Trigo et al., 2004; Erzini, 2005; Cravo et al., 2006) . Further construction continues with the Pedrógão reservoir, 23 km downstream of Alqueva (Filipe et al., 2004; Ortega et al., 2004) .
The Portuguese and Spanish governments' actions make explicit the national pressures driving the choice of infrastructure and sovereignty in an international basin. The shaded sections in Figure 3 depict the interplay of sovereignty and infrastructure in the Guadiana basin. Portugal and Spain utilised both interpretations of sovereignty, with their international agreements aiding the development of national benefits. Thus, their negotiation of international agreements such as the 1998 Albuferia Agreement aligns with an operational interpretation of sovereignty vis-à-vis institutional infrastructure, while simultaneously investing vast financial resources in unilaterally building physical infrastructure on their sovereign territory mirroring a Westphalian interpretation. This discrepancy favouring sovereign control over physical infrastructure and the water contained therein, is commonplace in most international basins as illustrated by Gould and Zobrist's (1989) description of the Niger basin. This apparent ''norm'' makes the Senegal basin countries' cooperation all the more remarkable for their alternative approach to hydro-interdependency.
Embracing interdependency in the Senegal basin
As independent countries, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal chose to jointly develop the Senegal river (see Figure 4) (Bornstein, 1972; LeMarquand, 1982) . Despite persistent political tensions, particularly between Senegal and Guinea, these countries negotiated a series of conventions (Vick, 2006) . In 1963, the countries recognized the river's international status, which afforded landlocked Mali navigation rights and created the Comité Inter-Etats pour l'Aménagement du fleuve Sénégal (CIE) to manage the river. The CIE was replaced by the Organisation des Etats Riverains du fleuve Sénégal (OERS) in 1968 which was given a mandate to unify the countries' economies (Bornstein, 1972; LeMarquand, 1982) , such that Mali's president, Modibo Keita, stated that the countries' nationals ''should regard themselves as citizens of the Senegal River states rather than as Malian, Guineans, Mauritanians, or Senegalese'' (quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, 1968 Bulletin, , p. 1108 Parallel to the political-institutional activities, the devastating droughts of the 1960-70s spurred the countries to gain greater control over their water resources. With donor support, the OMVS countries jointly constructed two dams costing US$866 million (LeMarquand, 1982) . Situated entirely within Mali, the Manantali dam was built to generate hydropower, regulate flow, develop irrigation and allow perennial navigation. Downstream, the Diama dam was constructed to regulate the inflow of saline water. The OMVS countries' ability to apportion the burden and benefits of joint development was critical to their construction. The countries used the ''Cle de repartition'' or burden-sharing formula that draws on two principles, ''solidarity'' which meant joint fiscal responsibility for the shared infrastructure and ''equity'' which meant a share in the benefits congruent with need. Thus, OMVS' debt was backed 100% by each member, giving a 300% guarantee (LeMarquand, 1982) . The burden-sharing formula was used to ensure loan guarantees and repayments were made in proportion to the benefits received by sector and country (Finger & Teodoru, 2003) .
The level of cooperation over several decades in constructing institutional and physical infrastructure shows a strong allegiance to an operational interpretation of sovereignty by all four basin countries. The shaded sections in Figure 5 illustrate the choices the Senegal riparians made in jointly building both institutional and physical infrastructure. Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal chose to compromise their autonomy to act in order to gain greater control over the whole basin and jointly tackle the basin's uncertain water availability. This is in stark contrast to the usual practice, as witnessed in the Guadiana basin, of using an operational interpretation to create institutions internationally but a Westphalian interpretation to build physical infrastructure nationally.
Identifying benefits
In both basins, the governments sought to ensure a reliable water supply. Despite this common endpoint, the countries' approaches diverged significantly, resulting in different outcomes. In this section, using the benefits derived as indicators of resilience, we identify and describe the types of resilience in each basin. We use the Sadoff-Grey typology (2002) to frame these benefits and the subsequent discussion on resilience trade-offs.
Type I
There has been significant ecological damage in the Guadiana basin linked to the dams and overextraction of aquifers. The large reduction in flow has affected sediment and nutrient loads downstream and threatened native fish species due to habitat alteration or destruction (Marta et al., 2001; Cravo et al., 2006) . The Alqueva project is expected to perpetuate the decline in both on-and off-shore species, including commercially important species such as sardines (Filipe et al., 2004; Erzini, 2005) . Unrestricted groundwater extraction from the Western La Mancha aquifer has had several impacts. It has affected one of Spain's most important wetlands, the Tablas de Daimiel, despite its designation as a national park and UNESCO biosphere reserve (López Sanz, 1999; Morris et al., 2003) . The wetland has shrunk from 20 km 2 in the 1960s, to less than 1 km 2 by the 1990s (Bromley et al., 2001) . The Guadiana river's source, the Ojos del Guadiana springs, has been dry since 1984 (Morris et al., 2003) . It has also resulted in the water table dropping by 20-30 m and over 50 m in some areas (Bromley et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003) . The aquifer's deficit is thought to represent one-third of Spain's national groundwater deficit (Morris et al., 2003) . The Senegal basin has not fared much better. The river's regulation has caused ecological problems and social disruption (Adams, 2000; Degeorges & Reilly, 2006) . The historic fluctuation in the delta's salinity underwent two shocks. First from the droughts and then from the river's regulation (Black & Sessay, 1998). The Diama dam altered the ecology and disrupted livelihoods downstream (Varis & Fraboulet-Jussila, 2002 ) and the Manantali dam had an impact on traditional recessional agriculture upstream (Lahtela, 2003) . Aquatic weeds proliferated, as did schistosomiasis (bilharzia) and malaria. OMVS is working to reverse the socio-ecological impacts through several programmes (World Bank, 2003) .
Type II
Upto 98 dams have been built in the Guadiana basin. The main economic beneficiary has been Spain's agricultural sector. Irrigated area within Spain increased from 30,000 to 40,000 ha in 1975 and to 120,000 ha by 1988 (Bromley et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003) . As mentioned earlier, the dams were constructed for irrigation rather than electricity generation, because the river's hydrological regime yields poor hydroelectric power (HEP) results. The Guadiana river only generates 5% of Spain's hydroelectricity or 5,000-10,000 GW h per year. Portugal's main economic benefits are forecast to derive from the Alqueva project, which is yet to be fully operational. Similarly, the OMVS countries' water and electricity supply has improved (Bader et al., 2003) 
Type III
The Guadiana riparians' primary socio-political benefit has been the Albuferia Agreement, which included tough negotiations on minimum flows. Portugal was only able to secure a guarantee, once it agreed to supply the Spanish city, Huelva from the Alqueva dam (Thiel, 2004) and to lower minimum flows on the Douro river, creating a ''virtual transfer'' from Portugal's north to its southern region (Lobo et al., undated) . Portugal's attempts to instigate joint development floundered. As Thiel (2004) explains, Spain demanded payment for the infrastructure already in place upstream, arguing Portugal had benefited from greater regulation and flood protection. Portugal refused, arguing that Spain's own benefits already covered the costs, and moreover, it had not been compensated for ecological damage incurred downstream. By contrast, OMVS or l'espace OMVS has been used to drive regional integration and cooperation. For example, in recognising Guinea's interests through the Water Charter (World Bank, 2003) , the OMVS countries made it possible for Guinea to join the organisation (Le Soleil, 2006) . The OMVS countries' joint ownership of infrastructure provides a common interest in safeguarding the works and the resultant benefits, even in the face of war. In 1989, inter-ethnic violence brought Senegal and Mauritania close to armed conflict (Parker, 1991; Black & Sessay, 1998; Lahtela, 2003) . Despite diplomatic ties having been broken off, in July 1991, the countries reached a settlement having used l'espace OMVS to resolve their differences.
Type IV
Portugal and Spain's cooperation on other issues is, we suggest, related more to their membership of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) than to their management of the Guadiana river. In the Senegal basin, regional cooperation involving the riparians has both spurred and benefited from cooperation over the river. Embedded in the post-independence constitutions of Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, is a strong narrative of African unity. Guinea's 1982 constitution and Mali's 1992 constitution even declared an intent to abandon their sovereignty partially or completely in pursuit of a ''united states of Africa''. The countries' willingness to cement their regional interlinkages spurred collective development of the river. The Manantali dam and its transmission lines are shaping a basin-wide electricity pool. Guinea's participation in OMVS not only gives it access to existing power generation, but also makes available more lucrative hydropower sites. The move towards greater cross-sectoral, crossborder linkages in the Senegal basin is supported by regional initiatives such as the long-standing Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and, more recently, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).
Constructing resilience?
The Guadiana and Senegal basin countries sought to establish a reliable supply that would be immune to the actions of other riparians and variations in flow by building infrastructure to store and move water at will. Whereas the Guadiana basin countries chose to work within socio-political constructed borders, the Senegal riparians used the physical hydrologic boundary of the river. In this section we examine the different approaches to managing the hydro-interdependency and see what lessons might be drawn using the Sadoff-Grey typology to organise the types of resilience. What emerges is not an overarching ability to absorb shock on all fronts in perpetuity, but resilience to particular issues for a period of time. Moreover, an action to increase one type of resilience can make the system more vulnerable to other shocks.
As Giordano & Wolf (2003) have observed, the environment is often sacrificed in the pursuit of economic development. Consequently, Filipe et al. (2004) note that freshwater biodiversity is being lost faster than terrestrial biodiversity, especially in semi-arid, arid regions where water demand is growing. This secondary regard for the ecosystem's resilience is evident in both the Guadiana and Senegal basins. Designed to assure a stable hydrological flow, the dams in the Senegal basin devastated the ecological system that relied on a dynamic deltaic environment. As has been well documented (see Black & Sessay, 1998; Adams, 2000; Varis & Fraboulet-Jussila, 2002; World Bank, 2003; Degeorges & Reilly, 2006) , the creation of a stable freshwater body in the delta distorted the fluctuation in salinity that prevented a single species from dominating the riverine ecology. A uniform water quality led to the proliferation of Typha australis, an aquatic weed which in turn harboured vectors for diseases and diminished the local communities' ability to sustain their livelihoods.
The ecological damage incurred by water resources development and the mitigation options can be seen in more detail in the Guadiana basin. For more than 40 years, the river's natural regime has been altered in both Spain and Portugal (Brandão & Rodrigues, 2000) . Despite constructing numerous facilities to make water more available in Spain, fears of an impending scarcity drove users to maximise extraction from the Western La Mancha aquifer, creating a ''war of the well'' (López Sanz, 1999) . Up to 9,000 new and illegal boreholes were drilled after the aquifer was officially declared overexploited (Morris et al., 2003) . At present, abstraction is 120% of recharge. If this is left undiminished, by 2031, the water table could be 80 m lower, leaving large areas without access to groundwater. The Spanish government has tried to improve the system's ecological resilience but it has stumbled over inaccurate data since groundwater use was funded privately and resulted in unregulated use (Bromley et al., 2001) . In 1985, legislation was introduced to curtail irrigation and farmers were given subsidies to stop existing production. Thus, between 1993 and 2002, farmers drawing from the Western La Mancha aquifer received h420 per ha not to irrigate crops. A technical solution was also sought. Between 1988 and 1996, six diversions were made from the Tagus-Segura aqueduct to restore the Tablas de Daimiel wetlands. A total of 80.5 million m 3 (6.5-17.8 million m 3 per event) was diverted. ''However, despite the transfer of such large volumes the diversions proved to have virtually no impact'' (Bromley et al., 2001, p. 388) . Despite a heavy investment programme in storage, water availability within the upper Guadiana basin remains vulnerable to a disparity between water supply and demand.
In attempting to develop economic resilience, countries in both basins have tried to secure key economic inputs such as water and electricity. The underlying premise has been, we suggest, an adherence to a deeprooted hydraulic paradigm in which conditions for the agricultural sector are optimised in order to drive economic prosperity (Saurí & del Moral, 2001; Lopez-Gunn, 2003) . In less developed economies, such as in the Senegal basin, the paradigm's pertinence appears intact with agriculture making a significant contribution to GDP. In 2004, the agricultural sector comprised 25.5% of GDP in Guinea, 36.4% in Mali, 18.3% in Mauritania and 17% in Senegal (FAO, undated) . However, in more developed and diverse economies, such as Portugal and Spain, where agriculture's economic contribution is diminishing, the sector's continued dominance of water resources is to be questioned. The hydraulic paradigm's role in driving water management is evident in the Guadiana basin, where the numerous dams were constructed mainly for agriculture. In Spain, agriculture is prioritised in the national water plans and benefits from subsidies that contradict national policies promoting cost-recovery (Maia, 2003) . Despite only contributing 3.5% to Spain's GDP, agriculture consumes 72% of available water (see Table 1 ). Tourism, which generates 11% of GDP, consumes a fraction of the remaining 28% of water. A similar situation is apparent in Portugal, not least with the Alqueva project's implementation. Though countries in both basins have successfully increased their access to key economic inputs, in Spain and Portugal's case, it is questionable whether their socio-ecological systems are made more resilient by continuing to privilege agriculture access to water over other economic sectors, not least because of the accompanying environmental problems.
If the Guadiana countries have been successful in making their socio-ecological systems more resilient economically through unilateral action, the Senegal countries have benefited politically by increasing the resilience of inter-governmental relations within the basins. Having started with a strong commitment to international cooperation in the 1960s, as evidenced by the countries' constitutions, cooperation stagnated in the 1990s before a revival by the decade's end. Despite the fluctuating intra-basin relations, the countries have used l'espace OMVS to build cooperation. For example, OMVS was critical in resolving a dispute between Mauritania and Senegal in 1989 that saw the countries step back from armed conflict because of their joint ownership of the dams (Parker, 1991) . Moreover, Guinea's joining of OMVS in 2006 marked a return to basin-wide decision-making that had been absent since 1972 (Le Soleil, 2006) . The countries' willingness to subsume sovereignty has resulted in tangible outcomes, such as electricity, that extend beyond any one country's ability to have produced these results alone. Consequently, the countries are committed to developing jointly a second generation of dams in the basin.
By contrast, the Guadiana countries have sought to limit their interdependency by building ''walls'' across the river to manage the common resource separately. Although the EU's Water Framework Directive prescribes treating international rivers as single units and producing joint development plans, Spain and Portugal persist with unilateral development. Both countries have devised national plans for the Guadiana river (Maia, 2003) , which utilise the terms negotiated in the Albuferia Agreement. The agreement merely underscores the countries' focus on water as an input and the importance placed on allocating it for unilateral development. The countries' hydrological interdependency is recognised vis-à-vis the guarantee of minimum flows, but it is not embraced with the vigour of the Senegal countries. Paradoxically, the agreement perpetuates their adherence to Westphalian sovereignty and the continued severance of the Guadiana river's hydro-interdependency.
Coupled with the intra-basin political benefits manifested by the Senegal riparians are the regional relationships extending beyond the river. Drawing from Sadoff & Grey (2002) , the benefit-sharing literature focuses on regional initiatives that are driven by successful cooperation over water resources (hydrocooperation). However, Alam et al. (2009) regard it as presuming a unidirectional influence, whereby, hydro-cooperation kick starts other initiatives. It does not recognise the bidirectional nature of regional cooperation and interpretation of sovereignty as operational which the Senegal riparians clearly depict. The post-independence Pan-African movement which envisaged political and economic union between all African states spurred the creation of l'espace OMVS. Having manifested tangible outcomes, the Senegal basin countries are conducting talks to link the basin to West Africa's power pool. In the Guadiana basin, Portugal and Spain's cooperation on other issues is, we suggest, related more to their membership of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) than their shared river.
Conclusion
With approximately 60% of the world's freshwater drawn from international rivers (Giordano & Wolf, 2003) , a large number of countries rely on shared water. These countries are vulnerable to decisions made by other riparians because of a hydrological interdependency that exists basin-wide. Governments usually seek to control hydrological flow through storage facilities on their territory following a Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty (Brown & Lall, 2006; Grey & Sadoff, 2007; Alam et al., 2009 ). While we accept that it is important to control hydrological flows, we argue that a socio-ecological system's ability to withstand shocks from water availability is not simply a matter of perpetually building more infrastructure. In other words, more dams and canals will not automatically protect a system from fluctuating water availability. This is because, in line with Klein et al. (2003) , we argue that a system's resilience is influenced by ''how'' decisions are implemented and not just ''what'' is implemented. In comparing the experience in two international rivers basins -the Guadiana, shared by Spain and Portugal and the Senegal, shared by Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal -we find that different approaches to the inherent hydro-interdependency create different patterns of resilience. In other words, a particular approach will construct resilience to certain issues, whereas another approach will result in a resilience to other issues. The different approaches and resultant patterns embody a trade-off in the issues to which a system is resilient. However, we note that the pattern manifested is a product of intended and unintended consequences and, therefore, caution against assuming all outcomes are prejudged and expected by governments.
In both basins, the ecosystem's health was compromised by damming the river for economic gains (López Sanz, 1999; Adams, 2000; Bromley et al., 2001; Marta et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003; Cravo et al., 2006; Degeorges & Reilly, 2006) . Although it can be argued that some of the dams were built before the environmental consequences of dams were fully appreciated, the continued reliance on infrastructure to augment supply suggests a preference over environmental resilience. Yet, as evidenced in the Guadiana basin, damming a river to supply key inputs to one sector can have a negative impact on the ecology that another economic sector depends upon. In supplying irrigation water, the Alqueva dam is altering the habitat of species including the commercially important sardine (Filipe et al., 2004; Erzini, 2005) . This suggests that Spain and Portugal are not only choosing to prioritise economic strength over ecological robustness, but also prioritising agriculture over other economic sectors.
Whereas, Spain and Portugal have benefitted economically, the Senegal riparians have also been able to manifest remarkable political benefits. In other words, Spain and Portugal are in a stronger position economically to withstand the impact of drought or floods. However, if circumstances necessitated a rethinking of current water expectations, we suggest the governments would struggle to overcome the constraints instituted by domestic politics. This is illustrated by Portugal's failure to get Spain's agreement to the Guadiana's joint development (Santafé-Martinez, 2003; Thiel, 2004) . By contrast, the Senegal riparians remain economically more vulnerable to a change in flow than their European counterparts. However, as demonstrated by the 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict (Parker, 1991) and 2006 accession of Guinea to the basin organisation (Le Soleil, 2006) , l'espace OMVS makes the countries more able to absorb politically sensitive issues. The system's political resilience may stem from post-independence movements such as Pan-African unity that spurred the Senegal riparians to envisage political union within their constitutions and develop a shared organisation built on the principles of solidarity and equity.
Although Spain and Portugal's approach has been successful historically, it is questionable whether the countries can continue to ''build'' their way out of water scarcity, without first re-examining how water is used once it is captured. The governments' continued prioritising of agriculture, over other more economically significant sectors, appears to be a leftover of the hydraulic paradigm which itself may not be appropriate any longer. In addition, the countries have, over the years, effectively ignored the basin's hydrological interdependency barring the implicit recognition in the Albuferia Agreement (Thiel, 2004) and the explicit impact on aquatic and land-based ecologies of damming the river (Marta et al., 2001; Cravo et al., 2006) . However, as water becomes more scarce, which is a possible outcome of climatic change, the hydro-interdependency between users will increase. Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the 25 additional dams Spain and Portugal are each planning on the Guadiana river (Collares-Pereira et al., 2000) will give them greater water security as water quantity and quality change.
The lesson to be drawn from the Guadiana experience is that following a Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty, building physical infrastructure can provide certainty over water availability in the short-term. However, this certainty is vulnerable to competing use by other riparians because of hydro-interdependency and because storage facilities cannot protect against all eventualities in perpetuity. In some cases, decisions to enhance a country's storage capacity can exacerbate the system's vulnerability. The Senegal experience demonstrates the longer term political benefits that can follow from using an operational interpretation of sovereignty and jointly developing both institutional and physical infrastructure. We do note, however, that the creation of an international basin organisation is not without its problems since many are effectively defunct. Thus, the nature of the institutions is important. OMVS' significance is that the member states remain committed to its mandate of jointly developing the river and have actively recognised their common interests and hydrological interdependency. In comparing the two basins, we note that the hydro-interpendency of an international basin cannot be ignored as it will reassert itself. Thus, the co-riparians will do well to acknowledge the interplay between sovereignty and hydrology in managing their interdependency.
